Philosophy thesis / Ethics of technology
Virtual Virtue: Ethics in Parity VR
Picture a virtual world that feels exactly like ours, with none of its material limits. There, ethics based on duty or outcomes falls apart. Only virtue holds.
Vir, from the Latin virtus (in the sense of potential or essence)
Introduction The premise
“Coffee, the experience of its taste, air, the way it fills your lungs, all of these experiences will feel exactly the same in and out of the machine.”Virtual Virtue, Introduction
Question one
What is the ideal ethical system for life inside a Parity VR?
Question two
What does that answer tell us about ethics in the material world today?
Sections 1.4 – 1.6 The collapse
Drag the slider from the world we live in to a Parity VR. Watch what happens to consequentialism and deontology once nothing is scarce and no one else can be harmed.
Material world
All three systems stand on their own. Consequences land on other people, property can be stolen and promises bind.
Right action is whatever brings the best consequences.
Leans on the material world for
Consequences that reach other people and things.
Inside Parity VR
Inside the simulation, there is only one thing experiencing consequences: you.
With no account of which good to aim for, it drifts toward measuring pleasure, even dopamine levels. To reach the highest good it has to borrow virtue ethics' structure.
BecomesFulfillment outcomes
Right action is whatever duty and the moral law require.
Leans on the material world for
Ownership, promises and real harm to real people. Kant's test against stealing only works where things can be owned.
Inside Parity VR
I cannot steal in a Parity VR.
The murderer-at-the-door dilemma goes inert. Only the duty to treat humanity as an end survives, and on its own that can't tell you how to live.
BecomesInternal duty: rules kept to build character
Right action is what a flourishing, excellent person would do.
Leans on the material world for
Very little. It needs knowledge of the human animal and its aim, eudaimonia.
Inside Parity VR
It keeps its structure. Aristotle's chain of ends still works when nothing is scarce. You are the goal; your becoming is the goal.
BecomesThe framework that holds
Sections 1.1 – 2.3 The argument, in order
We can't rule out that we're already in a simulation, and whatever could simulate the world could underlie ours too. So a Parity VR deserves the same ethical seriousness as the world we treat as real.
Nozick's experience machine is passive: you only think you're writing the novel. In a Parity VR a sober mind makes real choices, and a book written there has real words on the page.
The paper takes the single-actor view. If AI avatars can replicate human interaction, they can serve as means to flourishing whether or not they are conscious.
With one person experiencing every consequence and no account of the good, outcomes collapse into fulfillment. Reaching the highest good means taking on virtue ethics' aim.
Without ownership or material harm, Kant's rule-finding machinery has nothing to work on. Duty turns inward and becomes a practice of building moral character.
Every end points to a higher one until you reach eudaimonia, which is chosen for its own sake. That chain needs no scarcity to work.
Games have goals, participants and rules. In a Parity VR the goal is already known. Every rule should be a building block toward flourishing.
Rawls strips away people's material circumstances behind the veil of ignorance to learn about justice. Parity VR strips away external material constraints to learn about ethics.
Today's debate centers on preventing harm and writing rules. Designers, developers, policymakers and users should ask a more basic question: does this experience help people flourish?
Deontology and consequentialism draw their structure from material conditions. Virtue ethics works in any conditions, which puts it closer to a priori knowledge.
Section 1.2 Answering the experience machine
In 1974 Robert Nozick asked whether you would plug into a machine that gave you any experience you wanted. He gave three reasons not to. Each depends on a passive machine that only makes you think you're doing things.
“We want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.”Anarchy, State, and Utopia
In a Parity VR you actually do them. Write a great book in the simulation and the words are on the page. The meaning of those sentences doesn't evaporate because they're digital.
“We want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person.”Anarchy, State, and Utopia
A sober participant making autonomous choices can become kind or brave. With no material limits on experience, there is more room to develop character.
Plugging in “limits us to a man-made reality.”Anarchy, State, and Utopia
This is his strongest point. Still, we can't know our own world isn't already a simulation, and inside a Parity VR the question is what has value, which is different from what is materially real.
Section 1.7 How to apply it
“The game is a means, you are the player, and the end is you becoming yourself, to the absolute maximum.”
Survival is the oldest game there is. Everyone alive today descends from an unbroken line of players who finished it. Material constraints shaped that game, and many of them limit experience without helping anyone flourish.
A Parity VR lets us design the game on purpose. The thesis doesn't claim to know the rules yet. It claims they all have to serve one end.
Sections 2.2 – 2.3 Why it matters now
Parity VR may never arrive. Headsets are already pushing to blur the line between the virtual and the physical, and policy, law and ethics tend to lag behind technology.
Most ethical discussion of VR today is about preventing harm or setting rules. Those still matter. The thesis argues designers, developers, policymakers and users should start from a more basic question.
Their structure comes from material conditions. Their footing is a posteriori.
Works with or without material constraints. Closer to a priori knowledge, like arithmetic.
Ask of any virtual experience
Does this help the people inside it flourish? What kind of person does it make me?
Section III Objections
Under consequentialism or deontology alone, nothing would. Consequentialism can't say what the good is, so it can lead toward pleasure instead of fulfillment. Deontology sets a few strict rules and permits most hedonism beyond them.
Virtue ethics resists it by design. For Aristotle pleasure is fleeting and a by-product of other activity. Eudaimonia is complete and self-sufficient, a way of being rather than a feeling.
Some meaning goes, especially in material pleasures and accomplishments. Intellectual pleasures keep their weight. Learning about yourself, about reason and about the human animal still produce meaning, and a world where you can play endlessly toward eudaimonia makes self-knowledge more reachable.
Yes. We can't be certain other humans are conscious, and we would likely never know whether an avatar is. Treating avatars well can still be right, for the reason Kant gives about animals: cruelty to them damages the humanity in yourself.
So you treat virtual agents in the way that preserves your humanity and serves your flourishing. That standard doesn't depend on whether they are moral agents.
In conversation with
Nicomachean Ethics
Every end serves a higher one, up to eudaimonia. The structure that survives the move into VR.
Meditations on First Philosophy
We can't be sure we aren't dreaming, so we can't be sure we aren't simulated.
The Matrix as Metaphysics
Whatever could compute a world could already underlie ours. Simulation as metaphysics, beyond skepticism.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia
The experience machine. A sound argument against a passive machine, which a Parity VR doesn't have to be.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
The categorical imperative, whose rule-finding needs a material world. His remarks on animals guide how to treat avatars.
A Theory of Justice
The veil of ignorance shows that removing material facts can reveal ethical truth.
John McShea
About the author
John McShea studied philosophy at Middlebury College, where Virtual Virtue: Ethics in Parity VR was his honors thesis. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.
His work sits where virtue ethics meets the design of immersive technology. The thesis draws on Aristotle, simulation theory and the philosophy of games to argue that virtual worlds should be built for human flourishing.
He is also the founder of Nodebox, where he built the backend. Nodebox lets people send their work, files and reasoning to teammates straight from an AI chat, so a teammate's own AI can pick it up and continue.
The whole argument, all three sections, with notes.
Read Virtual VirtueThesis Full text
Vir, from the Latin virtus (in the sense of potential or essence)
Abstract “Parity Virtual Reality” (Parity VR) concerns virtual environments that have experiential equivalence to physical reality. Further, these environments transcend physical reality’s material constraints. Despite growing literature and interest in virtual reality and virtual worlds, the ethical implications of these technologies remain underexplored. Current discourse equally utilizes Deontology, Consequentialism and Virtue Ethics to evaluate Virtual Scenarios. However, I argue when we examine these ethical systems inside of Parity VR, only Virtue Ethics maintains in philosophical structure. In a world without material constraints, Deontology’s focus on duty, and Consequentialism’s focus on outcomes, implode, becoming subcomponents of Virtue Ethics’ core pursuit of eudaimonia (human flourishing). Parity VR reveals that Deontology and Consequentialism derive their conceptual structure from the physical world’s material conditions, while Virtue Ethics functions regardless of constraints. This examination not only defines how we should approach building and utilizing VR technologies today, but extends beyond hypothetical scenarios, suggesting that ethical debate should prioritize virtue rather than rule-based duties or material outcomes.
Key words Virtual Reality, Virtue Ethics, Simulation Theory, Ethics of Technology, Veil of Ignorance, Experience Machine, Philosophy of VR, Eudaimonia
VR machines, headsets, and experiences are accelerating in development today. Apple’s Vision Pro and Meta’s Oculus have already mastered building and maintaining virtual worlds. While this technology has not reached the mainstream due to price and cumbersome design, it will only be a short time until the virtual experience becomes customary and traditional in modern life. These virtual worlds mean grounds for human interaction devoid of law, poor ethical management, and moral neglect. With their boundless capacity for experience, these worlds will redefine how humans connect and communicate. If, for the first time in history, a human can experience almost anything, how do we govern these virtual places to maintain human ethics both in and outside of these virtual worlds?
Suppose, in the future, virtual reality achieves experiential Parity with the real world. Parity suggests a virtual machine in which, once entered, there are no distinguishable experiential qualities between it and the real world. Coffee, the experience of its taste, air, the way it fills your lungs, all of these experiences will feel exactly the same in and out of the machine. These virtual worlds are completely unbounded by material constraints. In addition, suppose all material-world needs of the participant have been met, shelter for the self and machine, and the necessities to sustain life. Machines with this technology could be called Parity VRs. What follows is not a predictive essay claiming to know if or how these Parity VRs could be achieved. Instead, this paper asks: What is the ideal ethical system for life in Parity VRs, and second, what does that tell us about ethics in the material world today?
While the implications of having technology capable of producing Parity VR would be fascinating, for example, a possible reckoning for capitalism (if driving a Ferrari inside the simulation is exactly parallel to the real thing, why work so hard to achieve it?), for our purposes, this discussion centers on uncovering the ethical ideal within the simulation itself.
First, I argue that Parity VRs could have Ethical Parity with the real world. Ethical Parity, as a term, means to carry the same depth and intensity of Ethical meaning. I argue Parity VRs and the real world can reach Ethical Parity, even though these two worlds could operate under different ethical systems and values. Second, I argue that the frameworks that support Deontology and Consequentialism break down in a VR Parity world, while Virtue Ethics, with revision, maintains its structure. Further, this paper demonstrates that adapting both Deontology and Consequentialism to Parity VR worlds reduces them to sub-components of a Virtue Ethics system. Through this argument, I strive to demonstrate that Deontology and Consequentialism draw their structural meaning from the material world, whereas Virtue Ethics draws its meaning from non-material concepts, maintaining its structure and logic regardless of material constraints.
To begin, this paper examines if Parity VRs have Ethical Parity with the real world (Section 1.1). Second, a framing of what action looks like in Parity VRs (Section 1.2). Third, a discussion of whether there should be multiple actors in Parity VRs (Section 1.3). Fourth, a discussion of Deontology and Consequentialism's insufficiency for Parity VRs (Section 1.4-1.5). Fifth, we will conclude that Virtue Ethics is an ideal model for Parity VRs (Section 1.6). Sixth, I will suggest a few possible ways to approach applying this ethical system to VR (Section 1.7). Seventh, this paper will demonstrate how philosophers draw meaning from virtual scenarios already and what this thought experiment means for ethics today (Section 2.1-2.3). Finally, we will address objections (Section 3.1.-3.3).
While Parity VR is currently hypothetical, with today’s rapid technological advancements, there is already need for a framework to address ethical issues. Policy, law, and ethics often lag behind rapid technological advancement, which calls for predicting ethical guidelines now, before the technology creates lasting harm.1 Current VR headsets, though not fully at experiential parity, push to blur the lines between the virtual and physical. By applying Virtue Ethics to VR design today, designers, developers and corporations can proactively mold these technologies to help humans flourish.
Can Parity VR's carry the same depth and intensity of ethical meaning as the real world?2 Descartes penned, "How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events- that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire - when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing" (Descartes, First Meditation, p. 13). We do not know we are sleeping in our dreams. Asleep, we believe that all is as real as when awake. Further, we could conclude that we can never know for sure that we are not dreaming. If, when dreaming, we are convinced we are awake, we cannot be sure not to dream at any given moment. Descartes' skepticism demonstrates, as many other thinkers agree, that we cannot know for sure if we are not already in a simulation.
David Chalmers similarly argues the possibility of our world being a simulation but from a metaphysical standpoint. He proposes a situation in which "A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist's laboratory…from the brain's point of view, things seem very much as they seem to you and me" (Chalmers, 2005, p. 1). Chalmers agrees with Descartes' skepticism, "To sum up the reasoning: I don't know that I'm not in a matrix. If I'm in a matrix, I'm probably not in Tucson. So if I don't know that I'm not in a matrix, then I don't know that I'm in Tucson. The same goes for almost everything else I think I know about the external world" (Chalmers, 2005, p. 1). Yet, Chalmers goes further than pure skepticism. For Chalmers, the hypothesis that we are in a simulation is not simply a skeptical one but a metaphysical one about the underlying nature of reality. Chalmers proposes a Computational Hypothesis. What if "physics as we know it is not the fundamental level of reality. Just as chemical processes underlie biological processes, and microphysical processes underlie chemical processes, something underlies microphysical processes. Underneath the level of quarks and electrons and photons is a further level: the level of bits. These bits are governed by a computational algorithm, which at a higher-level produces the processes that we think of as fundamental particles, forces, and so on" (Chalmers, 2005, p. 4). Chalmers suggests that beneath what we think of as the smallest physical process could be a computer process produced by tiny bits, the smallest form of data storage. Chalmers claims that "any abstract computation that could be used to simulate physical space-time is such that it could turn out to underlie real physical processes" (Chalmers, 2005, p. 11). Chalmers makes a metaphysical defense of simulation theory; if something, like a bit, could, in theory, simulate the world to the microscopic level, then it necessarily could underscore our own reality. If we take this to be true, then if we reach Parity VR, whatever technology enables this could logically underscore our own reality already.
Combining Descartes' skepticism and Chalmers' metaphysical approach to VR, it becomes clear that virtual worlds could have Ethical Parity. If we treat the real world as having ethical significance, yet we do not know whether or not we are already in a simulation, we must then treat a simulation with ethical weight. This is further supported metaphysically. Anything that could replicate the real world could logically underlie our own world. So, whatever underlies a Parity VR could simulate the real world. So, by extension, we should treat Parity VRs with ethical significance because whatever makes up that simulation could make up our own world, which we treat with ethical significance.
This does not suggest that a Parity VR then must have the same ethical norms as the "real" world, but that its ethical value could be equivalent to the real world. Some may be dissatisfied with this conclusion; regardless, as addressed, Parity VR could occur, and if it does, whether or not it is ethical will bear little weight on whether humans spend the majority of their lives inside them, suggesting the necessity to uncover ethical systems for this technology. Even if these words have Ethical Parity, what would action inside of these Parity VRs look like? I argue, these would not be simply pleasure-providing machines.
Robert Nozick famously suggested that action in Virtual Reality is inherently unethical. Writing an objection to "plugging in" to a VR world in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick proposes the following VR "experience machine": "Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience that you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book" (Nozick, 1974, p. 1). Note here that Nozick's imagined "experience machine" has two conditions, firstly, it gives you any experience you "desire," and secondly, you only "think" you are doing things like reading an interesting book, not actually doing them.
Nozick suggests that VR situations rob humans of inherent ethical values in three ways. He claims that "first, we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them. In the case of certain experiences, it is only because first we want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them or thinking we've done them" (Nozick, 1974, p. 1). And "A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob. There is no answer to the question of what a person is like who has been long in the tank. Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving?" (Nozick, 1974, p. 1). Finally, Nozick claims that "plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a world no deeper or more important than that which people can construct. There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated" (Nozick, 1974, p. 1). Nozick’s argument is sound, but his premises are not suitable for the nuances of actual Parity VRs.
Nozick's first claim is that we actually want to do certain things, not just experience them as if we were really doing them. In Parity VRs, I suggest you actually are doing things. Nozick suggests you only "think" you are doing things like reading or writing an interesting book. But if you write a great book in the simulation, why would it not actually be real? Would there not be real words on the page? Would the meaning of those sentences simply evaporate due to their digital format? The only true difference is that your creation and decision-making in Parity VR will not be constrained by the material world.3
Nozick's second claim against his "experience machine" is that humans desire to be a certain way, for example brave, kind, or funny. There is no reason I can find as to why a sober participant, making autonomous decisions, in a Parity VR, could not be a certain way. Could it not be true that a VR world would have the capability to teach one the meaning of kindness? Or the difference between bravery and cowardice? And through this process, you could gain the ability to “be a certain way,” for example, kind. I claim that, actually, VR worlds are inherently better suited to allowing humans to become a certain way since there are no material constraints on possible experiences. You could experience more and develop your character more without material world limitations.
Finally, Nozick suggests plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality. This claim is his strongest. Yet, this is a non-issue since we do not know if we are already in a simulation or not, even in a metaphysical sense. Nozick is concerned that we wouldn't have a deeper connection with reality in a simulation. But metaphysically, anything underlying a Parity VR could be the exact thing you have a “deeper connection” with in the real world, as detailed in section 1.1. Some might suggest this is problematic since we could not make new scientific discoveries about material reality in a man-made world. I agree, but in a Parity VR, the question is not about what is materially real but what has value. Second, I see no reason why scientific discovery in the traditional world could not continue even if Parity VR exists.
Nozick lays out a kind of experience machine where one is essentially in a passive state. This paper's argument is instead built upon a sober mind. The sober mind you have now reading this paper, but in the VR world. I accept the problems Nozick raises against his own premises, but I find his premises to be misattributed to VR. These premises lead to the problems he describes, but these premises are not inherent to VR technology, only to the limited VR Nozick imagines. In future Parity VRs, I suggest you could be a real participant, just the same as you are in the "real" world. What you do could stem from your own thinking capabilities, not simply some illusion. Nozick's premises are a kind of worst possible use of Parity VR technology, which I suggest is avoidable through the discovery of an ideal Parity VR ethical system.
Here is an appropriate place to discuss to what extent other "actors" are inside of these simulated VRs. Are you the only real human actor in your Parity VR? Or are we discussing a single simulation in which all human actors reside? I argue that the lens of a single actor (yourself only) in VR is more fruitful to evaluate from a skeptical view. Some may jump to argue for human life to be ethical, we must engage with human actors; yet, to what extent can we truly know our fellow human to be conscious and not simply an automaton? Apply radical skepticism to this question- we do not know if we are in a simulation, and by extension, we cannot know our fellow humans to be real either. Yet one could suggest that even if we can’t prove others to be conscious4, we still need other humans to develop our own consciousness.
To examine this question, apply Virtue Ethics. Aristotle claims that all actions aim at some kind of end or "good." Taking your dog for a walk aims for the end of health for your dog. While all actions aim at some good, some goods are inferior or "subordinate" to others. For example, lower ends (subordinate ends) are ones like ship-building to create a ship. The activity of building the ship is not valued for its own sake but for what it helps achieve. Higher ends (intermediate ends) are things like health, which is a good pursuit for the sake of living, say, a flourishing life. While higher ends are important, they are not the Chief end. Chief ends (the highest good) are things that are pursued for their own sake, not for any other end. This ultimate end, for Aristotle, is "Eudaimonia," which roughly translates to individuals' ethical flourishing (not to be confused with, say, hedonistic pleasure). Eudaimonia is an end and means in itself. It is the process of living well and ethically. For Aristotle, all other ends aim at this Chief good - the fulfillment of a human being living an ethical and excellent life. With this framework, it becomes clear that our ability to achieve Chief ends is our main concern. What we need, then, is the means to those ends. Since we are discussing Parity VR technology, it is fair to suggest we would have already achieved sophistication in AI avatar creation. Suppose these artificial actors have, at the minimum, seemingly full human capabilities, regardless of whether they are themselves conscious. Then, they can easily become the means toward Chief ends. If we can replicate these means of human interaction, with identical outcomes and ends, real human actors become unnecessary in a simulation.
Without material constraints, we won't need others to help us survive or experience anything. Parity VRs make us question to what extent interaction with other human beings could be dismissed for the sake of achieving the highest end (ethical human flourishing). Other human beings could be looked at as intermediate ends, whom we don't need if we can achieve the same ends (human flourishing) without them. If avatars allow us to achieve the same ends, I see no reason why real humans should be in one's simulation. This hinges only upon whether future AI avatars can replicate consciousness, not upon whether they actually are conscious.5 Only the replica is needed to achieve the same ends. If one rejects radical skepticism as a way to suggest the lack of need for others in these simulations, this second argument suggests we do not necessarily need others to reach the highest good- Eudaimonia (ethical flourishing).
With our scope clarified, we can now turn to evaluating each of the three major ethical systems and their applicability to Parity VRs. Consequentialism is an ethical system oriented towards consequences. Consequentialism denies that moral rightness in action depends on anything beyond the consequences of an action.6 For example, if I lie, but this creates more happiness in the world, then saying a lie is not morally wrong since it leads to good consequences. Consequentialists deny that any act has an intrinsic nature, making it moral or immoral; only the consequences of said action are of importance. Consequentialists might accept that something like murder could be immoral, but only to the extent that the murder elicits more negative consequences overall.
Consequentialism cannot function as the main ethical system for Parity VRs. Inside the simulation, there is only one thing experiencing consequences: you. If you break or destroy a beautiful painting in VR, that act's consequences have zero effect on anything beyond yourself. Of course, destroying this object may affect you negatively, but still, it only has an effect upon you. One might accept this conclusion and then argue that Consequentialism is a perfectly applicable system since only consequences matter in this VR. Instead, Consequentialism's logic actually becomes Virtue Ethics once adapted fully to a Parity VR. In its current form, Consequentialism cannot be the overarching system for a Parity VR because it provides no framework for how the "good," for which it aims, doesn't become hedonism. For example, if we know in a Parity VR that consequences only affect you (your mental state and happiness), a consequentialist would have no framework for deciding what that “good” is. A consequentialist might, for example, measure the “good” in terms of dopamine levels. But that could lead to a person achieving pure hedonistic pleasure only. But what’s wrong with pleasure? What if I like this idea of pleasure alone? There are two problems. First, how can the Utilitarian measure this “good”? If, as stated above, they were to measure according to dopamine levels, is this really the good? Or is the internal good a complex state, one very difficult to simply measure? The other problem is that pleasure might not be the highest good. Pleasure is an end from other means; it is not a means in itself. It is not the Highest pleasure since Eudaimonia is. If consequentialists truly want the "good" to achieve this good in a Parity VR, they would then necessarily take on a Virtue Ethics structure. To actually provide a path for the individual to reach the highest "good," the Consequentialist would become a Virtue Ethicist.
In addition, if one rejects the logic behind supporting a single-actor simulation, the argument above maintains its structure if there are multiple human actors in this simulation. With no material constraints, the cultivation of virtue is the only logically important consequence for each actor, and one person's cultivation does not restrict another from any traditionally materially restricted experience. Next, we will examine another ethical system that is unfit to service Parity VRs, namely, Deontology.
Deontology is the foil to Consequentialism. Deontologists suggest that there are some choices that are morally forbidden, regardless of consequences.
“Kant seems to deny any consequentialist element to his theory. Instead, whether or not a contemplated course of action is morally permissible will depend on whether or not it conforms to what he terms the moral law, the categorical imperative. Our duties can be understood in terms of respecting this imperative, even if respecting the moral law leads to bad effects rather than good ones. For example, we are obligated to keep our promises, even when keeping them results in less good” (Driver 2007, 80).
To determine what this "Right" is, deontologists utilize Kant's concept of the "categorical imperative." One formulation of the categorical imperative is "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). Essentially, to make a moral action, you must evaluate if this action leads to logical contradictions or undermines the possibility for action. For example, let's say you want to steal something someone owns because you like it. The underlying principle behind this action would be that it is ok to steal if you desire someone else's thing. We should then universalize this "principle," questioning what happens if everyone follows this rule: that stealing what they desire is universally moral. If we had a world like this, where everyone stole if they desired something, then the concept of stealing would break down and lose meaning. This would actually eradicate the meaning of the stealing because it would destroy the concept of ownership, and thus also the concept of stealing, leading to a contradiction. Thus, the very purpose of stealing - to take something another owns- would be a contradiction since no one would expect ownership anymore. Thus, for Kant, stealing cannot become a moral rule. The second formula for the categorical imperative is "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). For Kant, we should strive to treat people as ends, not simply means. And, for Kant, we are rational beings who have an internal sense of duty and knowledge as to what is universally moral. For example, it would be wrong to flatter a boss to get a promotion since you are treating them simply as a means to your own ends, not considering their inherent humanity.
Deontology's framework cannot be the ethical system for VR Parity because it lacks a framework to avoid hedonism. First, Deontology is grounded in a world where actions have consequences beyond the self. The universality rule Kant prescribes loses meaning in a virtual world. I cannot steal in a Parity VR; the concepts of ownership and stealing have no conceptual value without materiality and others. The parts of Kant's formula related to material conditions become meaningless.
One might argue that Deontology is actually perfectly suited for Parity VRs since its material foils would be solved. One example is the murderer at the door dilemma.7 A deontologist who refuses to lie might tell a murderer at the door where their friend hides in the house since they cannot lie. In a Parity VR, this dilemma would become inert. The scenario depends mostly upon the stakes of real-world harm like real death and material bodies. Because in Parity VR avatars or agents are artificial, those agents’ deaths, for Kant, would not lend themselves to any ethical consideration since they are not real persons. In this example, the complex framework Kant constructs to derive moral law becomes unnecessary. All that would remain relevant to a Parity VR of Kant’s framework would be the second formulation of the categorical imperative, that humans are rational beings who have an internal sense of morality and are ends in themselves. The rest of the rule-finding framework central to Deontology would collapse. Yet, while this doctrine of autonomy maintains its ethical weight and logical coherence, this alone cannot provide a framework for action in parity VRs.
Even when we maintain the doctrine of treating others as ends in themselves, in a non-materially constrained world, this isn't enough to guide ethical action. For example, I could easily respect others' autonomy by not interfering in others' simulations. But then, that leaves me the option to do absolutely anything else. I could rape, murder, kill virtual AI agents; I could live a life of pure hedonistic pleasure, and none of this would violate Deontological concepts. Deontology lacks the framework to guide action in a world not constrained by the material.
For Deontology to adapt to Parity VR, its rule creation system would have to switch from a focus on external actions towards developing an internal knowledge and practice of morality. Rules like truth-telling, or treating AI avatars well, become about the development of one's moral character. Deontology no longer looks like a rigid system that regulates the external world but a system of developing internal moral dispositions, the goal of Virtue Ethics. For example, someone in their Parity VR might tell the truth, not because of material consequences but because it aligns with their rational knowledge of morality. Deontological "duties" stop looking like impositions; instead, they become ways to strengthen your virtuous qualities and moral strength.
The same holds for a multiple-actor simulation. The only property one could "own" in this situation is intellectual or spiritual property, your own creations. This kind of ownership, I argue, still does not matter in a world without material constraints. First, you cannot profit off of your intellectual property; there are no material goods to desire, so there is no economic system. The only profit you can have is your fulfillment and enjoyment from your creation. Whether or not to share this property entirely depends on whether doing so would help the user reach their Eudaimonia. To steal property would be meaningless, and it would have no effect on the actor who originated the idea- it cannot rob them of the fruits of their labor. Let's imagine the concept of lying. In a solo simulation, it would only matter if something about lying affects your ability to reach fulfillment. And in a multiple-person simulation, why lie? Lie about what? Traditionally, lying is used to gain a material advantage, such as political power or wealth. Of course, one could lie to themselves, but this is ethically relevant only to the extent that it permits or limits one’s ability to reach Eudemonia. If lying carries weight in VR, this only extends to the actor's ability to flourish. The question becomes, What kind of person does lying make me? Whether to lie no longer concerns the morality of deceiving others but whether lying compromises your ability to reach fulfillment.
I claim the structure of neither Consequentialism nor Deontology can function as the preeminent ethical model for Parity VRs. By the time you adapt each system to Parity VR you end up needing Virtue Ethics to avoid hedonism, and for each of these systems to reach the “good.”
Virtue Ethics' functional framework is the superior model for Parity VRs. For Aristotle, ethics are not simply studied to gain theoretical knowledge; they're the tools that allow us to achieve our personal good and to fully understand what it is to flourish. As he writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, "Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use)" (Nicomachean Ethics, II.2, 1103b27). When Aristotle considers what this highest good might be, namely ethical flourishing for the human being, he writes, "If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good" (Nicomachean Ethics, I.2, 1094a18-22). The highest good must be desirable for itself, not for other goods, and all other goods are desirable for the highest good's sake. As Aristotle writes, "Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action" (Nicomachean Ethics, I.7, 1097b20-21). One cannot think of a better goal than this for human life. Aristotle's way of framing ethical goals is the ideal system to frame ethics inside a Parity VR. His conception of means and ends is easily adapted to a Parity VR scenario. The Virtue Ethics framework gives us the tools to achieve our personal flourishing in a world without material constraints.
In a Parity VR, there are no other goals than your own cultivation. Not material ones, not even communal ones, assuming you accept the logic behind a solo simulation. You are the goal; your becoming is the goal. Consequentialism collapses into fulfillment outcomes, and Deontology is transformed into a framework for internal duty that allows one to achieve one's own cultivation. Each system becomes tasked with the art of living well and with virtue. Aristotle's framework of ethical aims becomes the model for the act of self-creation and mastery needed in Parity VRs.
Parity VRs do raise a challenge- how can we form simulations to produce this ideal outcome of self-fulfillment? How do we form a simulation that can allow us to habitually learn our internal values and ethics, the goal of Virtue Ethics? These questions will be addressed below.
I suggest a simple solution to providing the structure for Virtue Ethics in these Parity VRs: games.8 What are games? Games have goals, games have participants, and games have rules. Let me propose a game; as the game begins, you have very little power, and your senses are deadened. As you grow in the game, you complete tasks; you learn how to find food and how to advocate for your needs. At a certain point you are completely reliant on yourself to continue leveling up in the game, but there are many hindrances. Your avatar can break down, and you may make mistakes, but in the end, through all these small games, you achieve something great: you have learned a great deal and achieved a sense of who you are. This game is called life, and I suggest it is not the best one. We are hardwired for games; survival is the most primal game of all. After millions of years of evolution, we have gotten very good at this game. Actually, for you to be playing the game, it means every person/life-form in your genetic line, back to the first form of life, lived long enough to complete this game, namely, pass on their genetics. The urge inside of you to survive and play games is the result of every single form of life before you, back to the first life ever on earth, successfully completing the game. This is a fantastic game, but there are major issues, such as material constraints. These constraints are important because we are hardwired to deal with them. Actually, we crave them. So much so that we now play games that have nothing at all to do with survival, even after we have passed on our genetics. A simple example is Chess against a computer.9 This game, life, has allowed us to achieve a good "sense" of who we are and even maybe flourish. But has it allowed us to have the best "sense" of ourselves? Have we really reached the highest level of flourishing possible, particularly if you consider the many arbitrary material constraints we have that don't lead to flourishing at all but limit our experience? VR developers already implicitly understand this principle, creating increasingly compelling VR experiences which offer more than entertainment. They provide opportunities for growth, creativity, and self-mastery.
In Parity VRs, the only possible ethical end is our own personal flourishing, which means if we were to set up the "game" of Parity VRs, we would know the goal- "Eudaimonia." But what are the rules?10 I don't know, but all the rules we create in order to make these games must be aligned with and become the building blocks of the end of Eudaimonia. The game is a means, you are the player, and the end is you becoming yourself, to the absolute maximum.
Ethics have been extrapolated from non-materially-constrained scenarios in the past. One such scenario is John Rawls’ "Veil of Ignorance." Rawls removes "material constraints" in his scenario and argues that this lends itself to superior ethical knowledge; my argument uses the same logic. Rawls proposes a kind of "original position" scenario. Imagine a group of individuals tasked with deciding what kind of justice would be best to enact on earth. Rawls imposes the following conditions, "First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like" (Rawls, 1999, p. 118). This Veil of Ignorance removes material considerations like status and individual abilities. "No one knows his situation in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage" (Rawls 1999, p. 120). Rawls argues that this group of rational individuals would form society, justice, and laws in a way that would achieve the highest overall score. He writes,
Put in terms of a game, we might say: they strive for as high an absolute score as possible. They do not wish a high or a low score for their opponents, nor do they seek to maximize or minimize the difference between their successes and those of others. The idea of a game does not really apply, since the parties are not concerned to win but to get as many points as possible judged by their own system of ends (Rawls, 1999, p. 125).
Rawls concludes that this group would determine rules that look something like justice being fairness. Rawls extrapolates from this hypothetical ethical scenario, suggesting this is how ethics should function in the real world as well. I discuss Rawls’ scenario to demonstrate that there is precedent for determining what is or is not ethical when we strip the world of material conditions. He clearly argues that individuals stripped of all material status would come up with the "best" form of ethics for the real world. I do not go so far as to remove the material constraint of a person’s own material being, but simply external material constraints. And, like Rawls’, I suggest that my own hypothetical exposes new ethical knowledge that can be applied in the real world. So, what do Hypothetical Parity VRs mean for the real world?
While this paper takes its inspiration from a far-off virtual reality technology, there are real-world implications to consider. This paper argues the logical structures of Deontology and Consequentialism, examined through a Parity VR, exposes that they are only components of a fuller ethical system, namely Virtue Ethics. What this means, for broader ethical considerations is that Deontology and Consequentialism are conditional ethical systems. They draw their structure from the material world. Virtue Ethics is relevant in all kinds of conditions. It could be said that Virtue Ethics are unconditional ethical systems. Deontology and Consequentialism have value, but that value collapses into something larger than themselves when material conditions are overcome, namely, Virtue Ethics. Determining whether these conditions will be overcome is not the goal of this essay, but it is worth considering that Deontology and Consequentialism alone cannot fully guide ethical action without Virtue Ethics.
For today's VR industry, our analysis suggests the necessity for recalibration. Ethical discussions around VR currently focuses primarily on preventing harm (consequentialism) or creating rules and guidance (deontology). These considerations do remain important, but developers, policymakers, and users should focus on an even more fundamental question - how to make virtual experiences contribute to human flourishing? As VR increasingly integrates into education and every day social interactions, designing with virtue ethics is not merely theoretically valuable but practically essential for this technology to genuinely benefit humanity.
We might not ever reach a Parity VR, so why does this thought experiment even matter? By demonstrating Virtue Ethics’ resilience to even a world with no material constraints, it demonstrates a kind of universal applicability and primacy inherent in Virtue Ethics. Most philosophers would like to suggest that reason and logic are independent of external material conditions. For example, in mathematics, we understand that 180/600000 is 0.0003, without any extra interaction with the world; this is logical or conceptual knowledge; it is universal and necessarily true in all circumstances. I suggest that Virtue Ethics is similar. It has value and strength for human beings in the completely conceptual setting, without any material knowledge. Of course, Virtue Ethics, with its teleological basis, requires knowledge of the human animal to function, but with this knowledge in hand, it can function in a non-materially constrained world. In contrast, Deontology and Consequentialism can only have true relevance when applied to material conditions. Virtue Ethics, thus, is closer to a priori knowledge, whereas Deontology and Consequentialism are derived from a kind of a posteriori knowledge.
If we have no material constraints in a Parity VR what would keep an individual from using a simulation to escape into ease and/or hedonism? If we were to use either only Deontology or Consequentialism in these Parity VRs, that is exactly what would happen. Consequentialism would not have the framework to direct what the "good" is and could lead the individual towards pleasure instead of fulfillment. Deontology would place strict rules on the participant, but beyond that, most hedonism would be permitted without consequences. The best way, I suggest, to prevent humans from abusing this technology would be to make Virtue Ethics the predominant framework. The aims of Virtue Ethics necessarily would combat hedonism. Pleasure, for Aristotle, cannot be the highest aim since it is not self-sufficient; it is the by-product of other activities and is fleeting. Eudaimonia, instead, is complete and self-sufficient, a goal in itself, and it is not a feeling but a way of being. To keep us from turning these simulations into Hedonistic playgrounds, they would necessarily need to be formed through Virtue Ethics. Pleasure alone would fail to satisfy the human animal since it is simply a by-product of Eudaimonia.
If we are consciously aware of being in a Virtual Simulation, won't we be plunged into nihilism and meaning will become arbitrary? Yes, some things will lose meaning, such as material pleasures. Instead, intellectual pleasures will still carry the same weight. Learning about yourself, reason, the human animal, and many other things will still produce meaning for humans. We will not be able to place meaning inside material accomplishments, but the ability to reach meaning through accomplishments of the self, for example, gaining self-knowledge, is not just possible but even more possible in a VR context where you can play endlessly in the pursuit of Eudaimonia.
Is treating AI avatars as means in a Parity VR truly ethical? Yes, as I’ve argued. We have already called into question, through the use of skepticism, whether or not we can know someone else to be conscious. This argument is even stronger in terms of AI avatars, whom, even if conscious, we would likely never be able to know.12 However, treating AI avatars ethically may still be useful. Whether or not to treat these avatars with ethical respect hinges upon whether this action aligns with your ability to reach Eudaimonia. To understand this, we can return to Kant. For Kant, animals are more machine than conscious. So, they do not deserve ethical respect, but for Kant, we should nonetheless treat animals well because the way we treat animals influences our humanity and how we treat other humans. “If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind” (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 240). We can apply the same to Virtual Agents; we must treat them in a way that preserves our humanity and allows for our Eudaimonia, not because they are actual moral agents.
In this paper, I argue that Virtue Ethics is the only ethical system capable of maintaining relevance to the ontological shift to a Parity VR. Unlike Consequentialism or Deontology, which would result in hedonism, Virtue Ethics maintains a framework for ethical action in a world where experience is not bound by material conditions. This is because Virtue Ethics draws its structure from the goal of human flourishing rather than contingent material conditions. I have argued that Consequentialism and Deontology rely heavily on material conditions to evaluate action, which means lessened value in a simulation.
Further, I aim for this thought experiment to reveal that even in our present material world, ethics should shift away from material conditions towards Virtue Ethics. We should refocus on Eudaimonia as the greatest ethical pursuit, whether virtually or in the material world. Even in a world with material conditions, without a guiding principle like Eudaimonia, we do not know what the “good” is that we reach for. Parity VR serves as a philosophical tool, reflecting the inadequacies of utilizing Consequentialism and Deontology alone, and encourages us to re-evaluate the primacy of virtue in guiding action now and in the future.
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